




Dialogue is the basic model for hermeneutics; therefore, no limits
are to be set on the dialogue in advance by unequivocal interpretation
of the situation. Hermeneutics is “a philosophical analysis and
description of the process whereby understanding is reached.” 1
In this sense, the hermeneutics of goodwill and interpretative
benevolence are part of a fundamental anthropology, since human
existence itself is an act of comprehension and of understanding.
I. The History of the Idea
Prior to a thorough and deep examination of ecumenical and
interreligious dialogue, we need to focus on the historical reality
of the important word, dialogue, itself. Both the term and its
meaning have been present during the whole history of
philosophy, right from its very beginnings, SOCRATES. For the sake
of brevity, we only mention here the authors frequently referred
to in ecumenical literature.
In this first part of our paper, we do not intend to offer a whole
list or any kind of full elaboration of these authors. We rather aim
to underline the fundamental importance of some of the thinkers,
philosophers and theologians, who are cited in the ecumenical
texts and contexts.
1. Dialogos in Philosophy
The very word dialogos, of Greek origin, is first used in the ancient
Greek world,2 with the original meaning of ‘to balance accounts,’ so
to say, to harmonize debits and credits (dialogizomai).
Since dialogos is from dia (which means through or between)
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and unique part. We must bring together and assemble these rare
stones, so that Jesus Christ may be whole. We must compose this
mosaic again, so that Jesus Christ can appear in the world in
which we live.
This is the basic task of each generation. Once more, again and
again, to assemble together the whole picture of Jesus Christ. What
we say about individuals can apply to the whole Church as well.
That is, to the entire spreading many-layered phenomenon of
present-day Christianity. Every denomination, every confession and
every tradition receives its own special stone (or a set of stones).
Each is the bearer of a different charisma. The charisma of each
denomination was given to serve the other denominations. No
denomination has the whole Jesus Christ. Only in all of us
together is the whole Gospel expressed; only in all of us gathered
together is the whole Christian life manifested.
What we said about individuals applies also to church
communities. As denominations and as spiritual traditions, we
need to accept ourselves as a gift from God. We should not disdain
our spiritual origins, but be thankful for the roots of our church
tradition.
As church communities, we also need to become gifts for other
denominations, confessions and traditions. We should not seek a
way by which we, from our own store, can pour gunpowder on
the shameful divisions that for hundreds of years Christians have
perpetuated among themselves.
But rather we should seek in our own tradition that which can
become a gift for all the others. And, finally, we need to learn to accept
other denominations and spiritual traditions as a gift from God.
Then we will live worthily of the vocation to which we have been
called and sent: the vocation to unity in the diversity of the Body
of Christ, where there are many gifts, but the very same Spirit.
The fourth theme for reflection is: Do I accept my denomination
as a gift from God? Am I prepared to put my tradition at the
service of other denominations? Do I accept other denominations
and spiritual traditions as a gift from God?
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1 This article of OTT Heinrich is of fundamental importance for us: The Horizons of Understanding and
Interpretative Possibilities. In SAMARTHA Stanley J. (ed.), Faith in the Midst of Faiths. Reflections on Dialogue in
Community. Genève, 1977. 85–89.
2 The following historical panorama is partly based on the article: VERGHESE Paul, Will Dialogue Do? The
Ecumenical Review, 1966/1. 27–38.
2. Persuasion in Rhetorics
There is a parallel development of the theory of dialogue,
although it does not use the term.3 In the long history of rhetorics,
which was one of the seven free arts (septem artes liberales), one
can find the prototype of current ecumenical and interreligious
dialogue in the era of the European Renaissance.
In the Renaissance rhetorical school of the theory of persvasio
collisione, which means persuasion in collision, one was supposed
to and expected to state different opposing positions fairly and
justly; otherwise one was regarded as not understanding the
views of the other.
In a similar way, in the postmodern way of thinking we are
expected by the others to be able to change the register, to jump
from paradigm to paradigm (following the expression of the
sociologist Thomas KUHN), or to play another language game4 in
order to have credibility in understanding each other.
After the relatively short period of the Renaissance, it was later
the Enlightenment era, and also the time of the XIXth century
liberalism, which wrote this way of philosophical thinking on their
flags.
“It is out of the discussion (collatione) of a variety of opinions
that truth is elicited.” This is a popular slogan from the theologian
ERASMVS of Rotterdam, and not surprisingly, was infrequently
cited in the age of polemical disputations.
II. Waving of Dynamics
“Many dialogues are full of correct logical argumentation, and
even then do not lead anywhere and create more tension and
suffering rather than solve problems or persuade the other part.
Many times the discussing partners differ in their unpronounced
presuppositions. A deeper understanding of the paradoxical
nature of our basic stances, and … a more nuanced approach
towards our convictions, can have a positive influence on the
communication between individuals, nations, cultures, religions
and life-views.”5
There are various and different levels of the dialogue model.
This model is applicable for individuals, for groups, even for
whole cultures. In this article we are centring around the second
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and logos (with the meaning of reason or word), linguistically this
term can be defined now as a “reasoned and logical discourse.”
The opposite of dialogue is monologue, which is isolated and
exclusive, self-righteous or solipsistic and egotistical. Essentially it
was SOCRATES who successfully introduced this term into
philosophy.
He was the inventor of the dialectical method, as we can read in
the texts of his most important disciple, PLATO, who uses the name
of SOCRATES in his fictitious and literary dialogues.
The contemporary theological resuscitation of the meaning of
dialogue is due to the German Jewish thinker, Martin BUBER, who
developed it into the theological thinking in his books Zwiesprache
(1929) and Ich und Du (1923).
He made two very important distinctions—drawing a line
between observer and participant, and discussion and dialogue.
The observers, in the first place, are able to describe the object of
their observations in words.
At the same time, the participants are addressed at the core of
their being, and also respond with the whole of their being. On
the other hand, discussion is an ana-lysis, a taking apart, which has
the goal of objective understanding, while dialogue has the
mutuality of the inner action as its basic element.
Genuine dialogue has a twofold movement in itself: a turning
toward the other, and an abandonment of self-isolation for an
inclusive awareness. The personalist, dialogical philosophers
following Martin BUBER, like Stefan ROSENZWEIG, Ferdinand EBNER
and Emmanuel LÉVINAS all start with the same conviction.
This conviction is that I do not exist without Thou, and we do
not exist only for ourselves; we are in a genuine sense encounter
and dialogue. Martin BUBER’s thoughts find their way to the
ecumenical movement especially through Yves CONGAR OP.
Yves CONGAR OP, who was a Roman Catholic theologian and a
Dominican friar, himself had to face the interesting problem that
this term of ours, dialogue, occurs not more than once in the New
Testament (NT).
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3 OUTLER Albert C. shows this parallel development in the article From Disputation to Dialogue. The Ecumenical
Review, 1963/1. 14–23.
4 MACQUARRIE John analyses this expression of Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN in Religious Language and Recent Analytical
Philosophy. In METZ Johannes B. (ed.), The Development of Fundamental Theology. Concilivm 1969/46.
164–165.
5 SLAVKOVSKÝ Adrián, Paradoxnost́  niektorých základných postojov č loveka (Paradoxical Nature of Some Basic
Human Stances). In ANDREANSKÝ E. (ed.), Filozofia a ž ivot – ž ivot filozofie (Philosophy and Life – Life of
Philosophy). Prešov, 2004. 120.
In this case, however, the real meaning of the term dialogue still
does not seem lucidly elaborated. On the other hand, there may
be a second, a deeper, answer given—namely that our approach
to the truth cannot be other than a dialogical one, at least in this
era of postmodernity (or hypermodernity, or late-modernity).
We must say, we have such difficult and such hard historical
times behind us, while we have been eagerly searching for and
fervently debating the notion of truth, especially of religious truth,
that there are not many other ways remaining.
The aims of any kind of dialogue are understood—and they
should be understood—differently, when we speak about secular,
about ecumenical or about interreligious dialogue.
For example, the recent Vatican text Dominvs Iesvs, which was a
document originally intended to speak about interreligious
dialogue, applies the same way of thinking and self-definition to
both ecumenical and interreligious dialogue.
When the theories of dialogues were elaborated, they were
structured towards interpersonal relationships. The discussion, the
communication, and also the dialogue between the different
traditions and worldviews has been mainly developed and
improved in the circles of the XXth century’s ecumenical
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and the third level, even if the original model was intended
mainly for interpersonal relationships. Let us now examine some
definitions which were attributed to dialogue in the course of the
history of ideas.
Dialogue in general can be defined as “a sustained conversation
between parties who are not saying the same thing, and who
recognize and respect the differences, the contradictions, and the
mutual exclusions between their various ways of thinking.”6
Genuine dialogue is “a spiritual journey in search of a shared
clarity.”7 Another definition for dialogue can also be the
following: “Dialogue is a style of living in relationship with
neighbours.”8
“Dialogue is a common quest for liberty; and, as a consequence
of progress in the liberty of each, a common effort to advance in
the direction of Truth.”9 There is a firm place for dialogue “if
diversity is not to become chaos, if unity is not to become mere
uniformity.”10
After having a quick look at the history of the term dialogue in
philosophy, rhetorics and also in theology, now let us see the
fruits of a thorough analysis of what has been gathered and
written on the vectors onwards and backwards. These vectors we
call the dynamics of dialogue, and we will also attempt to
synthesize our different findings.
1. Fusion of Transcendental Horizons
The previous mention of polemical disputes leads us to our next
question: Exactly why are we dealing with this problem, the
theoretical background of conversation or of dialogue?
The first and perhaps a kind of shallowish or superficial answer
could be that we deal with this issue because the dialogical
method is simply a fact to consider in the case of ecumenical and
of interreligious encounters.
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6 The definition is from TAYLOR John V., The Theological Basis of Interfaith Dialogue. International Review of
Mission 1979/4. 373.
7 This other definition is from the article of ROEST CROLLIUS Ary A. SI: Harmony and Conflict. Bulletin (Pro Dialogo)
1992/3. 377.
8 SAMARTHA Stanley J. in Guidelines on Dialogue quotes the definition. The Ecumenical Review 1979/2. 162.
9 SAMARTHA Stanley J. quotes the definition of DUBARLE Daniel in Religious Pluralism and the Quest for Human
Community. In NELSON J. Robert – BRILL E. J. (eds.), The Unity of Humankind in the Perspective of Christian Faith.
Essays in Honour of W. A. VISSER’T HOOFT on His Seventieth Birthday. Leiden, 1971.
10 TRACY David sets up these limits of dialogue in A Plurality of Readers and a Possibility of a Shared Vision. In
BEUKEN Wim – FREYNE Sean – WEILER Anton (eds.), The Bible and its Readers. Concilivm 1991/1. 123.
2. Healing Hereditary Wounds
The obstacles for dialogue, for the most part, except for the
danger of syncretism, are not specific to ecumenism or
interreligiosity. At this point we are not going to take time to
depict the history of strong pain and harsh suffering behind us,
but we will just touch upon the points which are important
because they form the main obstacles on the road to
understanding each other.
Let us remember the painful history, the different fighting and
bloody wars among committed humans in the name of defending
or spreading the truth, the hates and wounds between certain
groups, who could hardly say that they really understood the
others’ values and concerns.
Our cultural, religious and contextual backgrounds
fundamentally and essentially condition our experiences; and
later, our experiences determine the way we think about or
perceive the world.
Therefore, experiences influence our concepts and our
theologies. Nevertheless, we can also work on our experiences by
changing our concepts. The healing of our memories is a
responsibility for all of us.
‘Contemporary history’—that is, the vernacular politics—is also a
difficult-to-overcome obstacle between us: politics are religicised,
religions are politicised. Many times one can hardly manage to
separate them.
It is even more tragic that our historical experiences led us into
a language of abrasive-pugnacious separation. This language is
also one full of intolerance, of exclusivism, of tragically poisoned
and hegemonic monologue, which in itself gave strong support
back to the hostile deeds again.
This circvlvs vitiosvs is to be overcome by dialogue, the ministry
of reconciliation. The historical bonds are strongly connected with
psychology and also with the morality and ethics of dialogue.
The science of psychology is mainly concerned with making our
deeply rooted attitude-categories and our culturally structured
experiences more and more visible,17 transparent, and finally,
understandable.
There is a special danger which can emerge if we are not aware
enough of the coherence of our paradigms or of our narratives. If
137
movement, including or in close relation with interreligious
“convergence.”
Genuine dialogues usually begin every time any kind of tension
arises due to a striving for a more complete identity, or due to
dialectic antinomies, or impacts of the outside world.
The fourfold purpose of dialogue is mutual advancement,
elimination of prejudice, of intolerance and of misunderstandings.11
There is a pragmatic and a fundamental aim in dialogue.
The pragmatic aim is to remove mutual misunderstandings and
to serve common human tasks. The fundamental aim is the open
exchange of witness, experience, questioning and listening.12
The aim of dialogue can be a fusion of horizons (using the
technical term of Hans-Georg GADAMER), a consensus of
conscience,13 or a partial convergence for a new common horizon.
The purpose, aim and object of dialogue is “understanding and
appreciation, leading to further reflection upon the implication
for one’s own position of the convictions and sensitivities of the
other traditions.”14
The path of dialogue is from anathema (excommunication) to
dialogue, from dialogue to coexistence, from coexistence to
convivence, and from convivence to cooperation. The final goal is
reconciled difference, which is endured and productively shaped.15
Unlike dialectical dialogue, dialogical dialogue aims to stand
under the Spirit of truth and of love that manifests Herself,
shining through the logos of all the witnesses; to be led into a new
self-understanding within a brand-new horizon. The dialogue-
partners are taken over and are led by a Middle Third, that is, the
Subject matter of the dialogue, which is the Holy Spirit.16
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11 Francis ARINZE enlists these purposes in The Place of Dialogue in the Church’s Mission: Reflection on “Redemptoris
Missio”. Bulletin (Pro Dialogo) 1991/1. 23.
12 MULDER D. C. emphasizes the two main aims of interreligious dialogue in The Dialogue Between Cultures and
Religions. Kraemer’s Contribution in the Light of Later Developments. The Ecumenical Review, 1989/1. 15.
13 SAMARTHA Stanley J. uses this meaningful term, the ‘consensus of conscience’ in World Religions: Barriers to
Community or Bearers of Peace? In Insight: A Journal of World Religions 1979/1–2.
14 TAYLOR John V. mentions these aims in The Theological Basis of Interfaith Dialogue. International Review of
Mission 1979/4. 373.
15 MOLTMANN Jürgen meditates on the final aim of dialogue in the chapter called Theology in Interfaith Dialogue.
In MOLTMANN Jürgen, Experiences in Theology. Ways and Forms of Christian Theology. London, 2000. 20.
16 DURAISINGH Christopher in Issues in Mission and Dialogue. Some Reflections looks upon dialogical dialogue.
International Review of Mission 1988/3. 409.
17 These terms are from the article: PEURSEN C. A. VAN, Gospel and Culture: Experience and Conceptualisation. The
Ecumenical Review, 1987/2. 187–191.
The notion of ontological truth goes back to the ancient Greek
philosophical writings of PLATO, who speaks about the good, the
true and the beautiful. His disciple, ARISTOTLE, even gives a
definition for the truth: “To say of what is that it is, of what is not
that it is not, is true.”
In this definition the truth is rather a claim which is not false,
when checked against reality; and this very reality is that which
the truth-claim is made about. Problems and difficulties that are
more serious begin to gather and arise, however, when we try to
use truth to refer to the reality itself.
The end-station, the final destination, can and probably will be,
that anything that is (that has being), is true. Obviously enough,
it is not really a good and meaningful starting point for any kind
of a dialogue.
The existential truth, however, gives a kind of personal point of
view. According to this understanding, truth is an encounter with
the transcendent, and as a result of this encounter, a certain
quality of life.
In this usage of the word, the relevant question still remains: how
can we judge the truths themselves? The truth does not only consist
of following the truth, but it should also answer the question of the
rightness of truths themselves. Especially religious doctrines can not
have a purely theoretical or non-experiential truth.19
The third usage of truth is the epistemological one. We should
define the truth which exists in the true-false dichotomy as
follows: truth is that which can be clearly shown to be not false to
the satisfaction of all concerned.
In the huge field of religious and also of interreligious discourse,
there is a wide range of other statements which really are or only
can be called truth or true.20 We should be ready and well
prepared to distinguish, however, the pseudo-epistemological
usage of the word from the epistemological one.
In the former usage, the truth-claims are not demonstrable and
verifiable (although, in most cases, they are not falsifiable either),
except in terms of what is called by John HICK the eschatological
verification.
These can only be proclaimed and can be testified to, which
constitutes a real chance here and now for the existential truth.
139
we are too relaxed in considering the intransigence of our
worldviews, we can fall easily into the pit of eclecticism.
We should deal with the whole outlook of this behaviour in
connection with the topic of interreligious dialogue, since this is
the field where it is the most visible and also the most dubious.
Syncretism, as we can see, is a form of eclecticism.
III. Means and Gentles
Now we intend to collect some controversial but crucial
elements, which we call means of dialogue; and which were
revolutionary new paradigms during the last century. These
varied and multifaceted changes have made possible for example
the so-called “ecumenical miracle” so far, and further changes in
them could pave the way for further convergences in our thinking.
This chapter of ours follows the twofold aim of dialogue:
speaking the truth in love (and thus dealing with truth, language
and communication), and the ministry of reconciliation (dealing
with community).
1. Involvement in Truth
The whole wide field of epistemology is at the moment probably
the most difficult area in any kind of dialogue, but especially in
interreligious dialogue. One of the reasons for this is the fact that
truth is understood as a statement, an affirmation, and not so much
as a living, personal reality (like in the statement, “I am the Truth”).
We just briefly touch upon this question here, since, together
with ecclesiology, epistemology seems destined to be the
cornerstone of gaining more visible catholicity for the One Church
(Una Sancta).
We pointed out in the previous passages that to rightly
understand the Truth is one of the two fundamental and final
aims of dialogue. Also, Truth is the “third partner” in dialogue.
Aletheia, truth is a movement and a relation in which humans are
caught up and involved.18
Without going into this point too deeply, let us just explain
which kind of truth we mean when we use this term. Basically
there can be three main kinds of truth distinguished here: the
ontological, the existential, and the epistemological one.
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18 DURAISINGH Christopher quotes this definition of LEHMANN Paul in Issues in Mission and Dialogue. Some
Reflections. International Review of Mission 1988/3. 411.
19 BALTHASAR Hans Urs VON warns us to this truth in Truth and Life. In SCHILLEBEECKX Edward OP (ed.), Human as
Human and Believer. Concilivm 1966/21. 90.
20 The source of PICKARD William M. Jr.’s reasoning is Truth in Religious Discourse. The Ecumenical Review,
1985/4. 437–444.
Truth; rather it relativises the different and varied responses to the
Truth. In plurality or pluralism, we are almost forced to make a
choice and to decide.
The fundamentalist usually opts for truth at the expense of
tolerance; while the radical liberal opts for tolerance at the expense
of truth. But the genuine Truth makes tolerance imperative.24
2. Multilingual Vocabularies
Linguistics has undergone a fundamental and radical
development since the publication of the works of such scholars
as Ferdinand DE SAUSSURE. Without the practical implications of
this kind of developments in theology, however, there is no real
chance for effective and true reconciliation: for the complete
changing of language and of register, for example.
“How we speak is as important as what we speak.”25 The use of
rhetorics as the science of talking together has to focus not only on
how we do it, but on how we might improve it26 in the future.
The stony road from hegemonic monolingualism to inclusive
multilingualism is very long and is paved by learning and
changing; otherwise the different claims can never be
communicable. Dialogue belongs to and it is indeed the very
nature of every language. Even in Paradise God had certain
questions to Eve and Adam: Where are you?
Language has two main functions in this sense: it makes us heirs
and a part of a tradition, heritage, and in the instance that it is
mutually comprehensive,27 it makes us communicable, which means
being at the same time understanding and being understandable.
Neither of these sides is without the presence of dialogue: the
acceptance of a tradition is happening in asking and answering, as
well. We are responsible for the passing-on of our heritage further,
to our children and successors.
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Hence they rightly and exactly would be called truth-claims or
truth-beliefs of the homo convictvs, the committed human person
(the expression comes from Willem F. ZUURDEEG).
Let us at this point mention something about the question of the
possession of the truth. In our understanding, the pseudo-
epistemological truth-claims cannot be possessed; they only can
be confessed and testified to.
It is not the mere possession, but rather the sharing of truth that
leads to enrichment. We strongly feel the possession of
epistemological truth as a mere controversy in itself, if it is not
connected sufficiently with nor transformed into existential truth.
If the truth reaches and touches our inner self, it is not we who
possess the truth; rather the Truth possesses us. At the end, truth
itself seems to be of dialogical nature. Truth comes to us primarily,
if not only, in the form of answers to questions—answers coming
from weighing the evidence—and each new answer gives rise to
further questions.
The possessiveness of whole and full truth sounds very arrogant
and seems to be in sharp contrast with the humble attitude of the
one who is searching for the real meaning of what one believes
and for the real face of the One in Whom one believes.
While justice is blind, truth itself is dialogical, two-eyed. In an
elliptical model of reality, we too are called to look at Truth
through two eyes.21 There is not only a horizontal orientation in
dialogue, but there is also a vertical one, where we have the task
to understand the truth.
Prerequisites for this vertical orientation are on the one hand, the
giving up of the idea of possessing the whole truth, the true
knowledge; and on the other hand, we can only attribute well-
meaning error to our partner in dialogue.
In this way, we can recognize the partial aspects of truth, the
particvlæ veri, in the other. Finally, the Greek and Hebrew
concepts of truth, aletheia and emeth, constantly have to
supplement each other.
Aletheia signifies that which appears, emerges from hiddenness
into manifestedness. Emeth, however, signifies an unqualified and
ultimate certainty.22 Search for the truth happens through praxis,
action-reflection and living dialogue.23
Plurality as a contemporary phenomenon does not relativise
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21 SAMARTHA Stanley J. quotes ROBINSON John A. T.’s beautiful parallel on the elliptical model of the two-eyed
Truth in Ganga and Galilee: Two Responses to Truth. In HICK John – ASKARI Hassan (eds.), Diversities of Religious
Experience. London, 1981.
22 OTT Heinrich discerns aletheia and emeth in The Horizons of Understanding and Interpretative Possibilities. In
SAMARTHA Stanley J. (ed.), Faith in the Midst of Faiths. Reflections on Dialogue in Community. Genève, 1977.
85–89.
23 DEVANANDA Yohan sets these three areas in Living Dialogue. In ARAI Tosh – ARIARAJAH Wesley S., Spirituality in
Interfaith Dialogue. Genève, 1989. 77.
24 NEUHAUS Richard John sets up this new and revolutionary connection in Truth and Tolerance. First Things
1994/10.
25 BROWNSON James V. sees this connection in Speaking the Truth in Love. Elements of a Missional Hermeneutic.
International Review of Mission 1994/3. 503.
26 BOOTH Wayne C. in his article compares the interrelated role rhetoric and religion are destined to play in each
other’s life in Rhetoric and Religion: Are They Essentially Wedded? In JEANROND Werner G. – RIKE Jennifer L.
(eds.), Radical Pluralism and Truth. David Tracy and the Hermeneutics of Religion. New York, 1991. 79.
27 DHAVAMONY Mariasusai SI sets this fundamental requirement of mutual comprehensiveness in his chapter called
Christian Theology of Interreligious Dialogue. In DHAVAMONY Mariasusai SI, Christian Theology of Religions. A
Systematic Reflection on the Christian Understanding of World Religions. Bern, 1998. 203.
communication, however, is not yet a dialogue in the fullest sense
of the word at all, but only one of its means.
Communication can be defined as a reciprocal exchange of
thoughts, of feelings and of desired actions between partners of
equal status (equality) by means of signs, in a symbolic interaction,
with the aim of understanding (content and relations).34
The meta-hegemonic discourse, prototypical for any good and
meaningful conversation, has a Spirit that is of one being with the
conversants; thus God as well can rightly be called a Conversation.35
Based on the well-known story of Jesus and the Samaritan
woman from the Gospel of St. John (4,1–42), we can describe and
name ten important steps, which are the ten phases of
communication.36
The first phase of this communication is the perverted one, or the
poisoning one, in other words: rumour has it that Jesus was making
and baptising many more disciples than St. John the Baptist.
Then, as a second step, comes the usual, everyday communication
in the story. This is the realm of the various personal relations:
Jesus Christ asks the Samaritan woman for a drink at Jacob’s well.
Communication also can be impossible, when the walls of
separation seem to be immovably solid between the partners in
communication. The Samaritan woman reminds Jesus Christ of
the long history of pain, suffering and hatred between and behind
their two nations, between the Jewish and the Samaritan people.
The fourth step to consider here is the language and the speech
themselves, in other words the whole area of verbal
communication. The Samaritan woman at the well immediately
identifies Jesus as a Jew from His dialect, peculiar pronunciation
and special accent.
After these four levels our main topic follows here, which is the
communication in dialogue and also the personal encounter with
others. The two persons in the place of Sychar confront each other
rather harshly, and this confrontation finally leads to a change
inside these persons themselves.
The element, which afterwards creates a space in the
conversation, is the poetic communication or, in other words, the
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We are responsible for our languages, as for talents given to us
to cultivate them. We are called to pour our new wines into new
wineskins, which means for the time being, the very language of
consensus.
In this sense, we can make a distinction between two types of
language, the language of science (digital language) and the
language of healing or therapy (analogical language).28 Digital
language is objective, cerebral, and logical. Its functions are
negating, subordinating, analyzing, hierarchizing, explaining and
interpreting.
Analogical language, on the other hand, functions as imaginary,
metaphor, synthesis and totality. Some main characteristics of
analogical language can be discerned: condensation, figurativity,
pars pro toto, aphorism and ambiguity, pun, allusion. Analogical
language was born from the desire to embrace the other.29
There can be another classification of language and literature:
oral literature transforms, while literary literature informs.30 Even
the choice of syntax and vocabulary is a kind of political act that
defines and circumscribes the way facts are to be experienced. In
a certain sense, it even creates the facts that can be studied.31
Therefore, cleaning up the vocabulary is one of the most
important tasks in a dialogue.32 There is a language to be
approached, “a language of degrees and measures, of proximity
and quantity.”33
3. Communicating Existence
With this next part, we focus on the crucial question of
communication. The theories of communication are mainly
derivatives, or consequences of the different paradigms
concerning languages.
We can distinguish and classify some of the dialogues taking
place in the Bible, especially in the New Testament, some of them
being epoch-making or paradigm-creating even for our time. Mere
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28 Paul D. FUETER quotes and analyzes theses two kinds of languages in The Therapeutic Language of the Bible.
International Review of Mission 1986/3. 211–213.
29 WARD Graham quotes the opinion of LACAN Jacques in Theology and Postmodernism. Theology 1997/6. 438.
30 This summary is from HOLLENWEGER Walter J.’s article, The Ecumenical Significance of Oral Christianity. The
Ecumenical Review 1989/2. 262.
31 HOLLENWEGER Walter J. quotes the conviction of WINK Walter in The Ecumenical Significance of Oral Christianity.
The Ecumenical Review 1989/2. 263.
32 THOMAS T. K. reviews a book by ELLER Verbard, who lends these important tasks to the title of his book:
Cleaning Up the Christian Vocabulary, by Verbard ELLER. The Ecumencial Review 1977/1. 100–101.
33 HUFF Peter A. hails and greets the documents of the Second Vatican Council with these summarizing remarks
in Separation Incomplete, Communion Imperfect: Vatican II’s Ecumenical Strategy. One in Christ 1995/1. 62.
34 BARTHOLOMÄUS Wolfgang gives this definition of communication in Communication in the Church: Aspects of a
Theological Theme. In BAUM Gregory – GREELEY Andrew (eds.), Communication in the Church. Concilivm 1978/1.
97.
35 JENSON Robert W. deals in a whole article with this topic: On Hegemonic Discourse. First Things 1994/8.
36 The line of all that was mentioned beforehand could be seen in one of the outstanding exegeses by CHAPPUIS
Jean-Marc. Now we are following his argumentation and classification concerning the ten phases of
communication. His Bible study is called Jesus and the Samaritan Woman, The Variable Geometry of
Communication. The Ecumenical Review, 1982/1. 8–34.
IV. Plural Encounter in Community
We have not mentioned so far the final and ultimate aim of the
whole process of dialogue. This element is that we are called and
sent out to build a community on this Earth. The community we
seek is not only a simple community; it is rather a community of
communities, or of communications.
In other words, it is a genuine kind of communion (or koinonia).
In dialogue we basically search for genuine community. In this
kind of community we are held together by the values we share in
common, in differentiated interrelatedness.38
To build up a community of communities, for example to design a
fellowship of churches, of denominations or of confessions, we need
to be very clear concerning the meaning and role of pluralism.
Political pluralism means “the separation and division of powers,
decentralized administration, regionalism, functionalism,
representation, freedom of association and immunity from
excessively bureaucratic state regulation.”39
Cultural pluralism, on the other hand, is attained “when
members of different cultures accept a basic set of values that
enable them to live harmoniously together, while they remain free
to preserve their differences in other cultural areas.”40
All these units of pluralisms on different levels are the various
communities. Community is the place where all the
aforementioned elements effectively meet each other.
“Communion is the conditio sine qua non of communication.”41
But the opposite is also true: genuine communication is a necessary
condition for an effective and deep community. Above all, a shared
truth constitutes the community.42 In Latin, the etymology of
communio is com-munus, those who have the same task.43
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symbolic expression. Jesus plays with the different meanings of
water.
But talking with each other is not supposed to remain at this
level; it has to touch the very persons themselves. With a question
about the woman’s husband, the existential communication or the
disclosure of human begins.
Soon afterwards the theoretical, the spiritual or the theological
communication starts, in which God Godself is manifested on
Earth, in the very person of Jesus Christ, the Son of the Virgin
Mary.
Ninthly, the woman is challenged to make a Christian witness in
a kind of narrative communication. She goes to her native city to
proclaim the Messiah, Who most obviously arrived there.
The tenth and final phase in their personal encounter is basically
a mystery, a secret for all of us, and it provides a horizon for our
communication. The main aim of every kind of our speech, of our
communication or of our discourse should be the creation of a
new and more honest community, or theologically speaking, a
communion or koinonia.
The process of change of register can be described in three levels.
In the first level of communication, we usually superficially
reduce the other (the other idea or, even worse, the other person)
to the same, to one’s very self.
In the next dimension of the change, we still continue to maintain
this distinction, while at the same we also guarantee the relation.
This is the level of the poetic or the symbolic communication.
Finally, the third level is the one of self-giving, which only makes
receiving possible. This change of register encompasses the
transition from a binary to a ternary register, from a duality and
even a duel to a trinity and reconciliation, and from an exclusive
contradiction to an inclusive communion.37
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39 TAYLOR R. J. defines both cultural and political pluralism in The Meaning of Pluralism in Ecumenism. One in
Christ 1974/4. 369.
40 The other definition of pluralism is also in TAYLOR R. J., The Meaning of Pluralism in Ecumenism. One in Christ
1974/4. 369.
41 KHODR Georges underlines and also exemplifies the fundamental importance of community or koinonia in
Christianity in a Pluralistic World: The Economy of the Holy Spirit. The Ecumenical Review 1971/2. 127.
42 CERTEAU Michel DE speaks about the question of language as a community-constituting factor in Is There a
Language of Unity? In SCHILLEBEECKX Edward OP (ed.), Tension Between Church and Faith. Concilivm 1970/1.
83–85.
43 WILLEBRANDS Johannes explains and underlines this etymology in The Future of Ecumenism. One in Christ
1975/4. 322.
44 MBITI John, too, defines dialogue in such a way: In Search of Dialogue in Community. The Ecumenical Review,
1987/2. 192–196.
37 BLANCY Alain of the Groupe des Dombes speaks about the three levels of changing register in From Sign to
Symbol. A Change of Register. The Ecumenical Review 1981/4. 380–382.
38 SAMARTHA Stanley J. uses this term in his article Reflections on a Multilateral Dialogue. An Interpretation of a





Over the past one hundred years the World Student Christian
Federation (WSCF) has contributed, in different degrees, significant
impulses to the exploration of Christian unity in at least three distinct
contexts: that of its own movement, that of Christ’s world-wide
Church, and that of the total human community. I cannot try here to
do more than recall some of the key elements in this path of discovery.
I. Unity in and of a World-wide 
Student Christian Movement
1. Guiding Principles of the WSCF
In regard to its own movement – the unity of this “world”
movement brought into being by six men in the attic of an ancient
castle, which within three years had members in twenty-two
countries of Asia, Australasia, Africa, Europe and the Americas –
it is often forgotten just how creatively John R. MOTT secured its
freedom alike from undue North American domination and from
the model of the student association within the YMCA in which he
had himself been formed. Looking back in 1920, he defined the
“guiding principles” of the WSCF in eight points 1 :
A. The cornerstone principle of the whole construction is the
“recognition of the supremacy of the Lord Jesus Christ and of his
work as the only sufficient Saviour.” Any compromising of this
principle has had immediate consequences for the whole life of
the movement concerned.
B. The second is that of the interdenominational and
interconfessional character of the Federation (note: not un-
denominational, for it would never call its members to reduce
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The common language, the already existing communication, the
shared truth and the same purpose constitute and build up a real
community. Dialogue can even be defined as a face-to-face
encounter with one’s neighbour, in community.44
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